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3
1 Preliminaries
1.1 Assumptions
Special RSA Modulus: A special RSA modulus has the form N = pq, where p =
2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 are safe primes, the corresponding group is called Special RSA
group.
Strong RSA Assumption: Given an RSA modulus N and a random element g ∈ Z∗N ,
it is hard to compute h ∈ Z∗N and integer e > 1 such that he ≡ mod N . The modulus
N is of special form pq, where p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 are safe primes.
Quadratic Residues: The set QRN is the set of Quadratic Residues of a special RSA
group with modulus N .
2 Cryptography Utilities
In this section, we define utilities for computations in the underlying group structure,
especially QRN . Algorithms presented here are largely adapted from Victor Shoup’s
excellent book A Computational Introduction to Number Theory and Algebra [Sho09].
2.1 Special RSA modulus
Algorithm 1: generateSpecialRSAModulus(): Generate Special RSA Modulus N.
Input: candidate integer a, prime factors of positive, odd integer N : q1, . . . , qr.
Output: N, p, q, p’, q’
1 (p, p′)← generateRandomSafePrime()
2 (q, q′)← generateRandomSafePrime()
3 N ← pq
4 return (N, p, q, p’, q’)
2.2 Generate Random Safe Prime
The algorithm for generating safe primes is adapted from [MVOV96, Section 4.6.1].
A fast algorithm for generating primes is presented in [CS99].
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Algorithm 2: generateRandomSafePrime(): Generate random safe prime.
Input: required k bit-length of the prime.
Output: safe prime p, Sophie Germain prime p’
1 do
2 Select a random (k-1)-bit prime p’
3 p← 2p′ + 1
4 while not isPrime(p)
5 return (p, p’)
Algorithm 3: generateRandomSafePrimeFast(): Generate random safe prime (fast
algorithm).
Input: required k bit-length of the prime.
Output: safe prime e
1 Select a random (k+1)-bit prime P
2 do
3 R← computeRandomNumber((2k − 1)/2P, (2k+1 − 1/2P ))
4 e← 2PR + 1
5 while not isPrime(e)
6 return e
2.3 Commitment group
Algorithm 4: generateNumberSequence(): Compute number sequence [Sho09, Sec-
tion 9.5].
Input: integer number m ≥ 2
Output: number sequence (n1, . . . , nk)
1 n0 ← m
2 k ← 0
3 repeat
4 k ← k + 1
5 nk
R←− {1, . . . , nk−1}
6 until nk = 1
7 return (n1, . . . , nk)
5
Algorithm 5: generateRandomNumberWithFactors(): Compute random number in
factored form [Sho09, Section 9.6].
Input: integer number m ≥ 2
Output: random number prime factorization (p1, . . . , pk)
1 while true do
2 (n1, . . . , nk)← generateNumberSequence(m)
3 let (p1, . . . , pr) be the subsequence of primes in (n1, . . . , nk)
4 y ←
r∏
i=1
pi
5 if y ≤ m then
6 x
R←− {1, . . . ,m}
7 if x ≤ y then
8 return (p1, . . . , pr)
Algorithm 6: generateRandomPrimeWithFactors(): Compute random prime number
in factored form [Sho09, Section 11.1].
Input: integer number m ≥ 2
Output: prime number p factorization (p1, . . . , pk)
1 do
2 (p1, . . . , pk)← generateRandomNumberWithFactors(m)
3 p←
k∏
i=1
pi + 1
4 while not isPrime(p)
5 return (p1, . . . , pk)
Algorithm 7: createZPSGenerator(): Compute generator for Z∗p [Sho09, Section
11.1].
Input: prime factorization of the order of an odd prime p (p− 1 =
r∏
i=1
qeii )
Output: generator g for Z∗p
1 for i← 1 to r do
2 repeat
3 choose α ∈ Z∗p at uniformally random
4 compute β ← α(p−1)/qi
5 until β 6= 1
6 γi ← α(p−1)/q
ei
i
7 γ ←
r∏
i=1
γi
8 return γ
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2.4 Chinese Remainder Theorem
Algorithm 8: Compute the Chinese Remainder Theorem algorithm (CRT) [KL14,
Section 8.1.5].
Input: integers xp, xq, primes p, q with gcd(p, q) = 1.
Output: the integer x (0 ≤ x < p · q, x ≡ xp (mod p), x ≡ xq (mod q))
1 Compute X, Y using Extended Euclidean algorithm such that Xp+ Y q = 1
2 1p ← [Y q mod N ]
3 1q ← [Xp mod N ]
4 x← [(xp · 1p + xq · 1q) mod N ]
5 return x
When the factorization of N is known, in order to map x mod N to the mod p and
mod q representation, the element x relates to ([x mod p], [x mod q])
2.5 Extended Euclidean algorithm
Algorithm 9: Compute the Extended Euclidean algorithm (EEA) [Sho09, Section
4.2].
Input: integer a and odd integer b, a >= b >= 0
Output: integers d, s, t such that d = gcd(a, b) and as+ bt = d.
1 r ← a
2 r′ ← b
3 s← 1
4 s′ ← 0
5 t← 0
6 t′ ← 1
7 while r′! = 0 do
8 q ← br/r′c
9 r′′ ← r mod r′
10 (r, s, t, r′, s′, t′)← (r′, s′, t′, r′′, s− s′q, t− t′q)
11 d ← r
12 return (d, s, t)
2.6 Quadratic Residues Under Composite Modules QRN
2.6.1 The Jacobi Symbol (a|N)
We will use the Jacobi symbol to establish whether a group element is part of QRN . We
adapt the definition from Shoup [Sho09, Section 12.2]:
Definition 2.1 (Jacobi Symbol). Let a,N be integers, where N is positive and odd, so
that N = q1, . . . , qk, where the qi’s are odd primes, not necessarily distinct. Then the
Jacobi symbol (a|N) is defined as (a|N) := (a|q1) · · · (a|qk), where (a|qi) is the Legendre
symbol (cf. [Sho09, Section 12.1]).
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When it comes to computing the Jacobi symbol, this can be done using Euler’s crite-
rion computing:
a(qi−1)/2 (mod qi)
for each prime factor qi of N . However, this approach has an asymptotic complexity of
O(r · len(qi)3) for a composite of r odd primes qi: N = q1 · · · qr.
Shoup [Sho09, Section 12.3] specified an efficient algorithm similar to the Euclidian
Algorithm with asymptotic complexity O(len(a)len(N)). We will use said Algorithm 10
to compute the Legendre symbol (a|qi).
Algorithm 10: Compute the Jacobi symbol (A|N) [Sho09, Section 12.3].
Input: candidate integer a, positive odd integer N .
Output: Jacobi symbol (a|N).
Invariant: N is odd and positive.
Dependencies: splitPowerRemainder()
1 σ ← 1
2 repeat
3 // Loop invariant: N is odd and positive.
4
5 a← a mod N
6 if a = 0 then
7 if N = 1 then return σ else return 0
8 compute a′, h such that a = 2ha′ and a′ is odd
9 if h 6≡ 0 mod 2 and N 6≡ ±1 mod 8 then σ ← −σ
10 if a′ 6≡ 1 mod 4 and N 6≡ 1 mod 4 then σ ← −σ
11 (a,N)← (N, a′)
12 forever
2.6.2 Testing Membership of QRN
It is intractable to determine the membership in QRN without knowledge of the factor-
ization of N .
Given the factorization of N = q1 · · · qr, we can determine whether a ∈ Z∗N is a
quadratic residue in QRN by checking that
(a|qi) = 1 for all qi ∈ {q1, . . . , qr}.
Consequently, for the setup of the graph signature library with a special RSA modulus
of two distinct primes N = pq, we require
(a|p) = 1 ∧ (a|q) = 1.
2.6.3 Generating a Generator of QRN
We adapting the following definition from Shoup [Sho09, Section 2.7].
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Algorithm 11: elementOfQR(): Determines if integer a is an element of QRN .
Input: candidate integer a, prime factors of positive, odd integer N : q1, . . . , qr.
Output: true if a ∈ QRN , false if a 6∈ QRN .
Dependencies: jacobiSymbol()
1 o← true
2 for all qi:
3 if (a|qi) 6= 1 then o← false
4 end
5 return o
Definition 2.2 (Primitive Root). For a given positive integer N , we say that a ∈ Z with
gcd(a,N) = 1 is a primitive root modulo N , if the multiplicative order of a modulo N is
equal to φ(N).
Generating an element of QRN , in general, is simply achieved by squaring uniformly-
chosen random element of Z∗N . An integer a is a group element of Z∗N if and only if
gcd(N, a) = 1.
We need to ensure that the created element is not a generator of the sub-group of size
2. That is, the resulting quadratic residue must not equal 1.
Algorithm 12: createElementOfZNS(): Generate S ′ number.
Input: Special RSA modulus N .
Output: random number S ′ of QRN .
Dependencies: isElementOfZNS()
1 do
2 Choose at random S ′ ∈R {2, N − 1}
3 while not isElementOfZNS(S’) /* check gcd(S ′, N) = 1 */
4 return S’
Algorithm 13: isElementOfZNS(): Check if number is member of Z∗N .
Input: number a, modulus N .
Output: boolean: true or false.
Dependencies: isElementOfZNS()
1 if gcd(N, a) = 1 then
2 return true
3 else
4 return false
2.6.4 Number Representation.
splitPowerRemainder() presented in Algorithm 17 computes the greatest power of base 2
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Algorithm 14: verifySGeneratorOfQRN(): evaluate generator S properties.
Input: generator S, p’, q’.
Output: boolean: true or false
1 if S 6= 1 (mod N) then
2 if Sp′ 6= 1 (mod N) ∧ Sq′ 6= 1 (mod N) then
3 return true
4 else
5 return false
Algorithm 15: verifySGeneratorOfQRN(): evaluate generator S properties (alterna-
tive implementation) [Cam17]. The test is based on S ≡ 1 (mod N) iff N |(S − 1)
and S = 1 (mod p) and S = 1 (mod q). Testing that the gcd(S − 1, N) 6> 1 rules
out sub-groups with p′ or q′ members.
Input: generator S, modulus N .
Output: boolean: true or false
1 if gcd(S − 1, N) = 1 then
2 return true
3 else
4 return false
Algorithm 16: createQRNGenerator(): Generate generator of QRN .
Input: Special RSA modulus N , p’, q’.
Output: generator S of QRN .
Dependencies: createElementOfZNS(), verifySGenerator()
1 do
2 S’ ← createElementOfZNS(N)
3 S ← S ′2(modN)
/* all p′q′ elements of QRN apart from p
′ + q′ elements are
generators */
4 while not verifySGeneratorOfQRN(S) /* check properties of generator S
*/
5 return S
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contained in an odd integer a and its remainder a′. We note that in Java BigInteger the
most significant bit of a positive integer can be computed with getBitlength().
Algorithm 17: splitPowerRemainder(): Compute the 2ha′ representation of integer
a.
Input: odd integer a.
Output: Integers h and a′ such that a = 2ha′.
Post-conditions: a = 2ha′ and a′ is odd
1 h← mostSignificantBit(a)
2 a′ ← a− 2h
3 return (h, a′)
2.7 Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
Algorithm 18: generateCLSignature(): Simplified generation of a Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature
Input: message m
Output: signature σ
1 e← createRandomPrime(lρ, gs params)
2 υ ← createRandomNumber(lυ, gs params)
3 A =
(
Z
Rm0 S
υ
)1/e
mod N
4 σ ← (e, A, υ)
5 return σ
3 Graph Signature Library
The graph signature library implements the corresponding signature scheme (GRS) spec-
ified by Groß [Gro15].
The library realizes the interactions between a signer and a recipient, meant to create
a signature on a hidden committed graph, and the interactions between a prover and a
verifier, meant to prove properties of a graph signature in zero-knowledge.
Graph signatures can be formed by combining a committed (hidden) sub-graph from
the recipient and a issuer-known sub-graph from the signer. For the sake of the PRIS-
MACLOUD project, it is sufficient to realize issuer-known graphs, as the graphs will be
known by the signer (auditor).
3.1 Signer S
The signer is responsible to generate an appropriate key setup, to certify an encoding
scheme, and to sign graphs. In the HiddenSign() protocol the signer accepts a graph
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commitment from the recipient, adds an issuer-known sub-graph and completes the sig-
nature with his secret key skS. The signer outputs a partial graph signature, subsequently
completed by the recipient.
3.2 Recipient R
The recipient initializes the HiddenSign() protocol by creating a graph commitment and
retaining randomness R, possibly only containing his master secret key, but no sub-graph.
In this case, it is assumed that the signer knows the graph to be signed. Once the signer
sends his partial signature, the recipient completes the signature with his randomness R.
3.3 Prover P
The prover role computes zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge with a policy predicate P
on graph signatures. These proofs can either be interactive or non-interactive.
3.4 Verifier V
The verifier role interacts with a prover to verify a policy predicate P. The verifier
initializes the interaction, sending the policy predicate P as well as a nonce that binds
the session context.
3.5 Proof Context
The different prover and verifier algorithms co-create, amend and draw upon a joint proof
context. The proof context is specific for a session of a zero-knowledge proof. It contains
the entire proof state, that is,
• Integer and graph commitments,
• witness commitments,
• challenge,
• responses.
The prover’s proof context contains additional secrets:
• The randomness of integer and graph commitments,
• the randomness corresponding to the secrets of the ZKPoK, and
• the secrets themselves (especially the actual graph and its encoding).
3.6 Abstract Description
Parameters. We offer the description of the parameters used for the graph signature
scheme in Table 1. We use the same notation as the Identity Mixer credential system,
the standard realization of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [IBM13].
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Core Interface. The graph signature library draws upon an interface with multiple
operations. We first specify the abstract interface itself in Definition 3.1 and then discuss
the inputs and outputs subsequently.
Definition 3.1 (Graph Signature Scheme). The graph signature scheme consists of the
following algorithms:
((pkS, skS), σS,kg)← Keygen(1λ, gs params) A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which
computes the key setup of the graph signature scheme and corresponding commit-
ment scheme.
((pkS,E, skS,E), σS,es)← GraphEncodingSetup((pkS, skS), σS,kg, enc params) A probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithm which computes the setup of the graph encoding, es-
pecially, a reserved certified set of bases which are meant to hold the vertex and edge
messages.
C ← Commit(G;R) A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm computing an Integer com-
mitment on a graph.
(σ; )← HiddenSign(pkS,E, C, VR, VS) An interactive probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm between a recipient and a signer which signs a committed graph. We note that
both parties can have common inputs, namely a commitment C = Commit(GR;R)
encoding the recipient’s graph and disclosed connections points VR, VS, and the
Signer’s extended public key pkS,E. Hence, the signer and the recipient can con-
tribute sub-graphs to be combined. Private inputs: Recipient R: GR, commitment
randomness R; Signer S: skS,E, GS.
0 or 1 ← Verify(pkS, C,R′, σ) A verification algorithm on graph commitment C and sig-
nature σ.
Algorithm Input/Output Specification. We define the inputs and outputs for the
abstract interface as follows.
Definition 3.2 (((pkS, skS), σS,kg)← Keygen(1λ, gs params)). A probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm which computes the key setup of the graph signature scheme and corre-
sponding commitment scheme.
Inputs:
• general security parameter (1λ)
• key generation parameters of the graph signature scheme (gs params) described in
Table 1a.
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Outputs:
• secret key (skS) :
– factorization of a special RSA group with modulus bit length `n
– group setup of the special RSA group
– group setup of the commitment group Γ
– foundational generator S for the Quadratic Residues under the given Special
RSA modulus QRN .
– dedicated base for the Recipient’s master key R0.
• public key pkS:
– group setup of the special RSA group
– group setup of the commitment group Γ
• digitally sign the given public outputs and make the signature σS,kg public
• the parameters specified in gs params are stored for this instantiation of the Signer
S.
Group Setup:
Algorithm 19: commitmentGroupSetup(): Group setup for commitment group
Input: size of the prime order subgroup of Γ (lρ), size of the commitment group
modulus (lΓ), gs params
Output: order of the subgroup of the commitment group ρ, commitment group
modulus Γ, generators g and h
1 ρ← generateRandomPrime(`ρ, gs params)
2 Γ← generateGroupModulus(ρ, gs params)
3 g ← createGenerator(ρ,Γ, gs params)
4 h← gr
5 return (ρ,Γ, g, h)
Definition 3.3 (((pkS,E, skS,E), σS,es)← GraphEncodingSetup((pkS, skS), σS,kg, enc params)).
A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which computes the setup of the graph encoding,
especially, a reserved certified set of bases which are meant to hold the vertex and edge
messages.
Inputs:
• Signer S’s secret key (skS)
• Signer S’s public key (pkS)
• encoding setup parameters (enc params)
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Algorithm 20: KeyGen(): Main key generation algorithm for the graph signature
scheme and commitment scheme
Input: size of RSA modulus (`n), gs params
Pre-conditions: `n must be at least 2048.
Output: public key pk, secret key sk, signature Σ
1 (N, p, p′, q, q′)← generateSpecialRSAModulus(`n, lpt)
2 S ← createQRGenerator(N)
3 interval← [2 . . . p′q′ − 1]
4 xZ ← createRandomNumber(interval, gs params) /* xZ ∈R [2, . . . , p′q′ − 1] */
5 Z ← SxZ mod N
6 xR0 ← createRandomNumber(interval, gs params) /* xR0 ∈R [2, . . . , p′q′ − 1] */
7 R0 ← SxR0 mod N
8 (ρ,Γ, g, h)← commitmentGroupSetup(`ρ, lΓ, gs params)
9 sk ← (p′, q′, xR0 , xZ)
10 pk ← (N,R0, S, Z)
11 return (sk,pk)
Outputs:
• Public Output: bases reserved to hold vertex and edge encodings, Ri|i ∈ {1, . . . , `V}
for vertices and Rj|j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} for edges.
• Sign the generators, proving knowledge of their representation and binding them
to public key pkS.
• Signer’s extended public key pkS,E certified combination of original public key pkS
and the vertex and edge encoding bases Ri, Rj
• Signer’s extended secret key skS,E combination of original secret key skS and the
discrete logarithms logS(Rk)
• Signature σS,es
• Private Output: discrete logarithms of all produced bases with respect to generator
S, logS(Rk).
Definition 3.4 (C ← Commit(G;R)). A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm comput-
ing an Integer commitment on a graph.
Inputs:
• graph G
• randomness R
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Computations: It commits to the graph in an appropriate encoding, that is, holding
vertex and edge representations in different bases. As specified in the graph signature
definition [Gro15], the algorithm will establish a commitment as follows:
C = · · ·ReiΠk∈fV (i)ekpi(i) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ vertices i
· · ·ReiejΠk∈fE (i,j)ekpi(i,j) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ edges (i,j)
Sr mod N,
where ei and ej are vertex representatives. The label representatives ek are obtained with
the vertex mappings fV(i) and edge mappings fE(i, j).
Outputs:
• commitment C
• Committer retains the randomness R for future commitment opening or proofs of
representation
Definition 3.5 ((;σ)← HiddenSign(pkS,E, C, VR, VS)). An interactive probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm between a recipient and a signer which signs a committed graph. We note
that both parties can have common inputs, namely a commitment C = Commit(GR;R)
encoding the recipient’s graph and disclosed connections points VR, VS, and the Signer’s
extended public key pkS,E. Hence, the signer and the recipient can contribute sub-graphs
to be combined. Private inputs: Recipient R: GR, commitment randomness R; Signer S:
skS,E, GS.
The abstract interface specification for the interactive algorithm decomposes into two
interfaces for Signer S and Recipient R.
Signer.HiddenSign(pkS,E, C, VR, VS; skS,E,GS), and
Recipient.HiddenSign(pkS,E, C, VR, VS;GR, R).
Let us first discuss public and private inputs. While the Integer commitment C is
publicly known, it is usually computed by the Recipient R for the the given HiddenSign()
operation with the corresponding randomness R with Commit(). The Recipient will be
required to offer a proof of representation of the commitment as part of the interactive
protocol.
Note that the key-pair inputs (pkS,E, skS,E) refer to extended keys, that is, public and
private keys that contain the information on encoding bases of GraphEncodingSetup().
While the HiddenSign() algorithm allows for either both private input graphs GR and
GS to be present or absent, the standard case realized in TOPOCERT is that we have a
signer-known graph GS, but no hidden/committed graph of the Recipient R.
In most cases the connection points VR and VS will be equal, but that is not necessary.
1
As output on the Recipient side, R obtains a graph signature σS,G (or short σ) on the
combined graph G = GR ∪ GS valid with respect to pkS,E.
The Signer S does not produce an output.
1The first graph signature [Gro15] proposal referred to the connection points as VR, VS, which would
mean the set of all vertices and not a subset.
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Definition 3.6 (0 or 1← Verify(pkS,E, C,R′, σ)). A verification algorithm on graph com-
mitment C and signature σ.
The algorithm Verify() takes as inputs the Signer’s extended public key pkS,E, a signed
graph commitment C and its randomness R′ and the graph signature σ. The algorithm
outputs either 0 or 1, signifying that σ is either invalid or valid as graph signature on C.
We note that usually graph signatures, such as σ are used in proof of possessions
and further zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to show certain properties. In such
cases, we can use Verify() to signify a proof of representation that the secrets encoded in
commitment C are equal to the secret messages of the graph signature σ.
Then we have a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge defined as follows:
PK{(ei, ej, ek, e, v, r) :
Z ≡ ± · · ·ReiΠk∈fV (i)ekpi(i) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ vertices i
· · ·ReiejΠk∈fE (i,j)ekpi(i,j) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ edges (i,j)
AeSv (mod N) ∧
C ≡ ± · · ·ReiΠk∈fV (i)ekpi(i) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ vertices i
· · ·ReiejΠk∈fE (i,j)ekpi(i,j) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ edges (i,j)
Sr (mod N)
}.
Here the first equation proves the representation of the graph signature σ and the second
equation proves the representation of the commitment C, yielding equality over the secrets
ei, ej and ek.
We note that the proofs of knowledge on graph properties between prover and verifier
are specified as standard Σ-proofs.
3.7 Preliminaries
Notation. We specify parameters with the same conventions as the Specification of the
Identity Mixer Cryptographic Library [IBM13]. For lengths of bitstrings and numbers
specified by a positive integer `, {0, 1}` denotes the set of {0, 1, . . . , 2`−1}, while ±{0, 1}`
denotes the set of integers {−2` + 1, . . . , 2` − 1}.
Proof Specification. We specify zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (and correspond-
ing signature proofs of knowledge) in the Camenisch-Stadler notation [CS97]. Proofs
specified as such can be directly compiled into honest-verifier Σ-proofs as Schnorr proto-
cols.
In this specification, we will present the high-level PK/SPK specification as well as
its implementation, especially to make clear how commitments and differential random-
nesses will be computed to be subsequently proven. While the original Camenisch-Stadler
notation used the Greek alphabet to denote secret values, we use the Latin alphabet for
secrets in the implementation specification.
Proof Realization. In the implementation specification of Schnorr proofs, we use dif-
ferent diacritical marks above the variable symbol to denote types of variables (chosen
randomness as well as computed values):
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• the tilde (˜) diacritic denotes witnesses (chosen randomness or witness for a par-
ticular equation), and
• the hat (ˆ) diacritic denotes responses (solutions to proofs for particular secrets).
In the case that the secret symbol already carries a diacritical mark, that original di-
acritical mark is maintained and the diacritical mark for the variable type added on
top.
Secrets and public values receive diacritical marks to denote particular purposes in a
proof system:
• the breve (˘ ) diacritic refers to commitments and randomness for element repre-
sentations stripped of labels.
• the dot ( ˙ ) diacritic refers to commitments and randomness for secondary element
representations stripped of labels.
Commitments without diacritical mark will usually refer to the entire representation.
Java Variable Naming. In the Java implementation of the graph signature library,
we have the notation that the attributes/variables are named following closely the LATEX
encoding of the specification.
The following words are reserved: 1. tilde, 2. hat, 3. breve, 4. dot, 5. bar, 6. prime.
Here we maintain the order:
1. Type the value (e.g., tilde, hat),
2. The governing secret (e.g., m),
3. Possible modifiers (e.g., prime)
4. The index,
Java variables are names according to the Java naming conventions with exceptions:
• The variables are transformed in mixed camel case, that is, starting lower-case word
and continuing with capitalizing each following word.
• Variables must retain their original case, e.g., we write m˜ as tildem, not tildeM
• Indices are prefixed with a single underscore “ ”
Here are a few examples:
• m˜0 = tildem 0
• r′i = rPrime i
• aˆi¯,¯i = hata BariBarj
Element Ordering. For the computation of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic and messages
sent over the wire, we maintain the following order. The most general element comes
first, followed by the elements created in subsequent issuing/proof stages.
Specifically, that principle implies the following framework order:
1. context,
2. Group modulus N ,
3. QRN generator S,
4. Target value for RSA-based signatures Z,
5. Long-term parameters/bases of the graph signature scheme
5.1 Master secret key base R0,
5.2 Bases reserved for vertex representation Ri,
5.3 Bases reserved for edge representation Rj.
6. Public values and commitments present for the given proof,
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Figure 1: Illustration of the relationship of different exponent length in a Schnorr proof,
with the Recipient blinding v′ as example. The length of the secret to be proven, here
v′, determines the lengths of the other exponents.
Recipient Blinding v′ `n + `ø
Witness Randomness v˜′ blinds c · v′ `n + `ø `H `ø
Recipient Response vˆ′ = v˜′ + c · v′ `n + `ø `H `ø +1
7. Witnesses computed for the given proof T˜ (tilde-values, ordered according to the
principles above),
8. Responses computed for the given proof (hat-values, ordered according to the prin-
ciples above),
9. Proof challenge c.
Parameter Length. In Figure 1, we give an overview of how different exponent lengths
relate in Schnorr proofs. We consider the example of the Recipient blinding randomness
v′, which will be proven in an response equation
vˆ′ ← v˜′ + c · v′,
using the witness randomness v˜′ as blinding.
Crucially, the length of the witness randomness needs to be `ø longer than the product
of challenge c and secret, here `H and `n + `ø to guarantee statistical zero-knowledge
property. In the given example, thereby, the witness randomness has a length of `n +
2`ø + `H . Finally, the response will be one bit longer than this due to the sum of two
values of equal length.
4 Key Generation
4.1 Group Setup
Compute bases Z,R,R0, Ri, Rj using key generation algorithm 20. We refer to the
randomness used in this algorithm as rZ , r, r0, ri, rj, all positive integers with at most
length `n. The signer stores these respective random exponents as dlogS(Z), dlogS(R0),
dlogS(Ri), and dlogS(Rj) for all bases of the extended public key.
In order to guarantee that the elements of the public key lie in the correct subgroups,
we construct a proof of representation on the base generation using a non-interactive
proof, which is called a Signature Proof of Knowledge (SPK). The Prover constructs a
proof and publishes the proof to the Verifier, who can verify the generated proof.
• The following proof and verification computations prove knowledge of the discrete
logarithms dlogS(Z), dlogS(R0), dlogS(Ri), and dlogS(Rj). They iterate over all
bases reserved for vertex and edge representation. It
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V}; ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E}.
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• Compute the following Signature Proof of Knowledge:
SPK{∀i{1, . . . , `V},∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} : (rZ , r, r0, ri, rj) :
Z ≡ ±SrZ (mod N) ∧
R ≡ ±Sr (mod N) ∧
R0 ≡ ±Sr0 (mod N) ∧
Ri ≡ ±Sri (mod N) ∧ Rj ≡ ±Srj (mod N)
}
1. Create uniformly-chosen witness randomness:
r˜Z ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H
r˜ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H
r˜0 ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V} : r˜i ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} : r˜j ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H
2. Compute witnesses:
Z˜ ← S r˜Z mod N
R˜← S r˜ mod N
R˜0 ← S r˜0 mod N
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V} : R˜i ← S r˜i mod N
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} : R˜j ← S r˜j mod N
3. Compute challenge:
c← ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V},∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} : H(context,N, S, Z,R,R0, Ri, Rj, Z˜, R˜, R˜0, R˜i, R˜j)
4. Compute responses:
rˆZ ← r˜Z + c · rZ
rˆ ← r˜ + c · r
rˆ0 ← r˜0 + c · r0
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V} : rˆi ← r˜i + c · ri
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} : rˆj ← r˜j + c · rj
5. Output proof signature:
P ← ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} : (N,S, Z,R,R0, Ri, Rj, rˆZ , rˆ, rˆ0, rˆi, rˆj, c)
• The Verifier computes verification:
1. Check lengths:
rˆZ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
rˆ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
rˆ0 ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
∀i ∈ ±{1, . . . , `V} : rˆi ∈ {0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
∀j ∈ ±{1, . . . , `E} : rˆj ∈ {0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
if any length check fails then abort and reject, outputting ⊥.
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2. Compute tˆ-values:
Zˆ ← Z−cS rˆZ mod N
Rˆ← R−cS rˆ mod N
Rˆ0 ← R−c0 S rˆ0 mod N
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V} : Rˆi ← R−ci S rˆi mod N
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} : Rˆj ← R−cj S rˆj mod N
3. Compute the verification challenge:
cˆ← ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , `V},∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `E} :
H(context, N, S, Z,R,R0, Ri, Rj, Zˆ, Rˆ, Rˆ0, Rˆi, Rˆj)
4. Verify equality of challenge:
if c = cˆ then
accept
else
reject, outputting ⊥.
5 Issuing Specification
We specify the issuing of graph signatures based on the underlying SRSA Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature scheme. Given the use of the underlying signature scheme, the is-
suing specification draws upon the original Camenisch-Lysyanskaya SRSA scheme [CL02],
the Identity Mixer Cryptographic Library Specification [IBM13], and the issuing specifi-
cation offered by Groß [Gro14].
The given issuing protocol differs from existing CL-Signature implementations in its
accounting for graphs as input of both parties.
The issuing protocol is executed between two parties, a Signer opening the protocol
with a nonce, and a Recipient possibly inputting a committed (hidden) graph and com-
mitting to the Recipient master secret. The protocol is executed in four rounds, 0 to
3.
5.1 Protocol: Signer Specification
5.1.1 Round 0: Nonce Generation
Inputs
Designated recipient.
1. Signer chooses a random nonce n1 ∈R {0, 1}`H .
2. Signer stores the random nonce for future reference.
3. Signer
n1−→ Recipient
Outputs
Signer nonce n1
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5.1.2 Graph Signature Computation
Inputs
Signer Extended Secret Key: skS,E
Recipient Commitment: U and corresponding proof P1
Recipient nonce n2
1. Signer verifies proof signature P1, iterating over responses representing vertices i
and edges (i, j) in G′ = (V ′, E ′):
1.1 Check lengths of integer responses:
vˆ′ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+2`ø+`H+1,
mˆ0 ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2,
∀i ∈ V ′ : mˆi ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2,
∀(i, j) ∈ E ′ : mˆ(i,j) ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2.
1.2 if any length check fails then reject P1 and abort issuing, outputting ⊥.
1.3 Compute:
Uˆ ← U−c(S vˆ′)Rmˆ00 · · ·Rmˆipi(i) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ vertices i
· · ·Rmˆ(i,j)pi(i,j) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ edges (i,j)
modN
1.4 Verify challenge:
cˆ← ∀i ∈ V ′,∀(i, j) ∈ E ′ : H(context, N, S, Z,R0, Rpi(i), Rpi(i,j), U, Uˆ , n1)
1.5 if cˆ 6= c then reject P1 and abort issuing, outputting ⊥.
2. Signer generates partial graph signature to be completed by the Recipient. These
computations iterate over the i ∈ V ′′ and (i, j) ∈ E ′′ of the Signer graph G =
(V ′′, E ′′).
2.1 Choose a random prime:
e ∈R [2`e−1, 2`e−1 + 2`′e−1]
2.2 Choose a random integer v¯ ∈R ±{0, 1}`v−1
2.3 Compute: v′′ ← 2`v−1 + v¯
2.4 Compute:
Q← ∀i ∈ V ′′, ∀(i, j) ∈ E ′′ : Z
USv′′ · · ·ReiΠk∈fV (i)ekpi(i) · · ·R
eiejΠk∈fE (i,j)ek
pi(i,j)
mod N
Specifically, the Signer uses the knowledge of the discrete logarithms dlogS(Z),
dlogS(R0), dlogS(Ri), and dlogS(Rj) to facilitate this computation in the ex-
ponent. We break this computation down into vertex and edge exponents:
∀i ∈ V ′′ : e¯i ← (dlogS(Rpi(i))eiΠk∈fV (i)ek)
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∀(i, j) ∈ E ′′ : e¯(i,j) ← (dlogS(Rpi(i,j))eiejΠk∈fE(i,j)ek)
Using these exponents, the Signer completes the computation:
Q← ∀i ∈ V ′′,∀(i, j) ∈ E ′′ :
(
USv
′′+...+e¯i+...+e¯(i,j)+...−dlogS(Z)
)−1
mod N
2.5 Compute A:
i. Knowing the group order # QRN = p
′q′, the issuer computes the multi-
plicative inverse of e under p′q′. As e is co-prime with p′q′, e−1 exists. For
subsequent proofs we refer to e−1 as d.
ii. A← Qe−1 mod p′q′ mod N
2.6 Signer stores: Q, v′′, context
3. Signer creates a proof of correctness and knowledge of d = e−1:
SPK{(d) : A ≡ ±Qd (mod N)}(n2)
3.1 Choose witness randomness:
d˜ ∈R [2, p′q′ − 1]
3.2 Compute witness:
A˜← Qd˜ mod N
3.3 Compute challenge:
c′ ← H(context, Q,A, A˜, n2)
3.4 Compute response: dˆ← d˜− c′ · d mod p′q′
3.5 The proof consists of P2 ← (dˆ, c′)
4. Signer sends (A, e, v′′), P2 and the graph encoding for G′′ to the Recipient
Outputs
Preliminary graph signature: (A, e, v′′) and corresponding proof P2
Graph encoding for G′′
5.2 Protocol: Recipient Specification
5.2.1 Round 1: Commitment to Master Secret Key and Hidden Graph
Inputs
Signer nonce n1
Signer extended public key: pkS,E
Recipient graph: G′ (optional)
Recipient master secret key: msk
1. Recipient chooses a uniformly-chosen random integer v′ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø
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2. Recipient commits to the graph with an appropriate encoding following the Com-
mit() algorithm:
U ← · · ·ReiΠk∈fV (i)ekpi(i) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ vertices i
· · ·ReiejΠk∈fE (i,j)ekpi(i,j) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ edges (i,j)
Sv
′
mod N (1)
3. Recipient computes an non-interactive proof that the commitment is correctly com-
puted (proof of representation) using a Signature Proof of Knowledge (SPK):
∀i : i ∈ V ′, the set of vertices of Recipient graph G′ = (V ′, E ′)
∀(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ E ′, the set of edges of Recipient graph G′ = (V ′, E ′)
In the following proof, the mi and m(i,j) contain the full encoding of vertices and
edges (incl. labels) of Recipient graph G’, respectively. The base R0 is reserved to
encode the Recipient ’s master secret key msk as m0, used to bind graph signatures
to the same entity.
SPK{∀i ∈ V ′,∀(i, j) ∈ E ′ : (mi,m(i,j), v′) :
U ≡ ±Rm00 · · ·Rmipi(i) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ vertices i
· · ·Rm(i,j)pi(i,j) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ edges (i,j)
Sv
′
(mod N) ∧
v′ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø ∧ m0 ∈ ±{0, 1}`m ∧
∀i ∈ V ′ : mi ∈ ±{0, 1}`m ∧ ∀(i, j) ∈ E ′ : m(i,j) ∈ ±{0, 1}`m
}(n1)
3.1 Create uniformly-chosen witness randomness:
v˜′ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+2`ø+`H
m˜0 ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
∀i ∈ V ′ : m˜i ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
∀(i, j) ∈ E ′ : m˜(i,j) ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
3.2 compute witness:
U˜ ← Rm˜00 · · ·Rm˜ipi(i) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ vertices i
· · ·Rm˜(i,j)pi(i,j) · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
∀ edges (i,j)
S v˜
′
mod N
3.3 compute challenge:
c← H(context, N, S, Z,R0, Rpi(i), Rpi(i,j), U, U˜ , n1)
3.4 compute responses:
vˆ′ ← v˜′ + c · v′
mˆ0 ← m˜0 + c ·m0
∀i ∈ V ′ : mˆi ← m˜i + c ·mi
∀(i, j) ∈ E ′ : mˆ(i,j) ← m˜(i,j) + c ·m(i,j)
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3.5 output proof signature: P1 ← ∀i ∈ V ′,∀(i, j) ∈ E ′ : (c, vˆ′, mˆi, mˆ(i,j))
4. Recipient chooses a random nonce n2 ∈R {0, 1}`H
5. Recipient
U, P1, n2−−−−−→ Signer : commitment U , proof signature P1, nonce n2
6. Recipient persists the following structures: context, randomness v′
Outputs
Recipient graph commitment: U with corresponding proof P1
Recipient nonce: n2
5.2.2 Round 3: Signature Completion
Inputs
Preliminary graph signature: (A, e, v′′) and corresponding proof P2
Graph encoding for G′′
1. Compute v ← v′′ + v′
2. Recipient verifies graph signature (A, e, v), iterating over all i ∈ V and (i, j) ∈ E
of the combined graph G = (V,E):
2.1 Check that e is prime and e ∈ [2`e−1, 2`e−1 + 2`′e−1].
2.2 if this length check fails then abort the issuing protocol, outputting ⊥.
2.3 Compute:
Q← ∀i ∈ V, ∀(i, j) ∈ E : Z
SvRm00 · · ·R
eiΠk∈fV (i)ek
pi(i) · · ·R
eiejΠk∈fE (i,j)ek
pi(i,j)
mod N
2.4 Compute
Qˆ← Ae (mod N)
2.5 if Qˆ 6= Q mod N , then abort the issuing protocol, outputting ⊥.
3. Recipient verifies P2
3.1 Compute
Aˆ← Ac′+dˆ·e mod N,where
Aˆ ≡ Ac′Qdˆ (mod N)
3.2 Compute cˆ← H(context, Q,A, Aˆ, n2)
3.3 if cˆ 6= c′ then abort the issuing protocol, outputting ⊥.
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Given:
d ≡ e−1 (mod p′q′); d˜ ∈R Z∗p′q′
A˜ ≡ Qd˜ (mod N); c′ ∈ {0, 1}`H
dˆ ≡ d˜− c′ · d (mod p′q′)
Aˆ ≡ Ac′+dˆ·e (mod N)
≡ Ac′A(d˜−c′·d)·e (mod N)
≡ Ac′Ad˜·eA−c′·d·e (mod N)
≡ Ac′(Ae)d˜A−c′(e−1·e) (mod N)
≡ Qd˜Ac′A−c′·1 (mod N)
≡ Qd˜ !≡ A˜ (mod N)
Figure 2: Correctness proof for the verification of P2.
4. if the steps 2 and 3 are successful then store the graph signature σ = (A, e, v)
along with the corresponding graph encoding.
Outputs
Final graph signature: (A, e, v)
Corresponding graph encoding for G
We include the straight-forward, yet non-standard correctness proof of the verification of
P2 in Figure 2.
6 Overall Proof of Geo-Location Separation
Note that the proof protocol for geo-location separation is exemplary for other proofs,
incl. proof of possession and pair-wise difference. We include a monolithic specification
of the required proofs to offer an intuition what is computed and ascertain correctness.
The proof will iterate over all vertices i ∈ V and all edges (i, j) ∈ E for the entire
graph G = (V,E). As such the proof will disclose the maximal size of the graph in the
proof of possession.
We note that the proofs have been written separately in the corresponding publications
for clarity, asking for a compound execution for referential integrity. Here, we execute
the entire proof protocol in one go.
What is proven. On an input by the Verifier with a subset of known vertex identifier
V¯ , the Prover engages in an SPK to prove that the geo-location labels associated with
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those vertices vi ∈ V¯ are pair-wise different. Notably, this proof requires that all vertices
of the graph are labeled with their respective geo-location. The proof does not disclose
anything else.
6.1 Geo-Location Separation Proof
• Verifier chooses a random nonce n3 ∈R {0, 1}`H .
• Verifier n3−→ Prover
• Prover computes commitments on all vertex representations:
Ci ← ReiΠk∈fV (i)ekSri mod N
• The Prover iterates over pair-wise different vertex encodings i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ ⊆ V , solving
the Extended Euclidian Algorithm EEA() for arguments for Be´zout’s Identity:
(di¯,j¯, ai¯,j¯, bi¯,j¯)← EEA(mi,mj), such that,
di¯,j¯ = ai¯,j¯mi + bi¯,j¯mj.
If mi and mj are indeed separate, they must be co-prime and di¯,j¯ = 1. If and only
if this is true, ai¯,j¯ and bi¯,j¯ exist to fulfil Be´zout’s Identity for 1. The Prover stores
the values ai¯,j¯ and bi¯,j¯ for pair-wise different vertices i¯, j¯ in V¯ .
• The Prover computes and stores the differential randomness for pairs of commit-
ments Ci¯ and Cj¯ for pair-wise different vertices i¯, j¯ in V¯ :
ri¯,j¯ ← −ri¯ · ai¯,j¯ − rj¯ · bi¯,j¯.
• Prover establishes a Proof of Geo-Separation over the entire graph G = (V,E),
which entails the steps to (a) prove possession of the graph signature σ, (b) prove
representation of the commitments Ci on the graph representations, incl. equality
to the message exponents, and (c) prove pair-wise difference over the vertices in V¯ .
∀i ∈ V, (i, j) ∈ E,∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ ⊆ V :
SPK{(m0,mi,m(i,j), e, v, ri, ai¯,j¯, bi¯,j¯, ri¯,j¯) :
Z ≡ ±Rm00 Rmipi(i)R
m(i,j)
pi(i,j)A
′eSv (mod N) ∧ (GSPossessionProver())
∀i ∈ V : Ci ≡ ±RmiSri (mod N) ∧ (CommitmentProver())
∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ : R ≡ ±Cai¯,j¯
i¯
C
bi¯,j¯
j¯
Sri¯,j¯ (mod N) ∧ (PairWiseDifferenceProver())
e ∈ {0, 1}`e ∧ v ∈ ±{0, 1}`v ∧ m0 ∈ ±{0, 1}`m ∧
∀i ∈ V : mi ∈ ±{0, 1}`m ∧
∀(i, j) ∈ E : m(i,j) ∈ ±{0, 1}`m
}
1. Randomize A
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1.1 Choose rA ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø
1.2 Compute the randomized signature (A′, e, v′)
A′ ← ASrA (mod N)
1.3 Compute v′ ← v − e · rA
1.4 Compute e′ ← e− 2`e−1
2. Choose witness randomness uniformly at random:
e˜ ∈R ±{0, 1}`′e+`ø+`H+1
v˜ ∈R ±{0, 1}`v+`ø+`H+1
m˜0 ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
∀i ∈ V :
m˜i ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
r˜i ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
∀(i, j) ∈ E:
m˜(i,j) ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ :
a˜i¯,j¯ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
b˜i¯,j¯ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
r˜i¯,j¯ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
3. Compute witnesses:
Z˜ ← (A′)e˜Rm˜00 Rm˜ipi(i) · · ·R
m˜(i,j)
pi(i,j)S
v˜′ mod N
∀i ∈ V : C˜i ← Rm˜iS r˜i mod N
∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ : R˜i¯,j¯ ← C a˜i¯,j¯i¯ C
b˜i¯,j¯
j¯
S r˜i¯,j¯ mod N
4. Compute hash:
c← H(context, A′, Z, Ci, Z˜, C˜i, R˜i¯,j¯, n3)
5. Compute responses:
eˆ← e˜+ c · e′
vˆ′ ← v˜′ + c · v′
mˆ0 ← m˜0 + c ·m0
∀i ∈ V :
mˆi ← m˜i + c ·mi
rˆi ← r˜i + c · ri
∀(i, j) ∈ E:
mˆ(i,j) ← m˜(i,j) + c ·m(i,j)
∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ :
aˆi¯,j¯ ← a˜i¯,j¯ + c · ai¯,j¯
bˆi¯,j¯ ← b˜i¯,j¯ + c · bi¯,j¯
rˆi¯,j¯ ← r˜i¯,j¯ + c · ri¯,j¯
6. Output P3 ← (c, A′, eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0, mˆi, mˆ(i,j), rˆi, aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)
6.2 Geo-Location Separation Verification
• Proof of Geo-Separation (Verifying)
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• Proving Knowledge of a Signature (GSPossessionVerifier())
• For the verification of the proof of geo-location separation, the Verifier operates
over pair-wise different vertex encodings i¯, j¯ in V¯ .
• The Verifier receives an input:
P3 = (c, A
′, eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0, mˆi, mˆ(i,j), rˆi, aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)
1. Check lengths:
eˆ ∈ ±{0, 1}l′e+`ø+`H+1
vˆ ∈ ±{0, 1}`v+`ø+`H+1
mˆ0 ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2
∀i ∈ V :
mˆi ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2
rˆi ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
∀(i, j) ∈ E :
mˆ(i,j) ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2
∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ :
aˆi¯,j¯ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
bˆi¯,j¯ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
rˆi¯,j¯ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
2. if any length check fails then reject the proof and abort verification, out-
putting ⊥.
3. Compute tˆ-values
Zˆ ←
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c
Rmˆ00 (R
mˆi
pi(i) · · ·R
mˆ(i,j)
pi(i,j) )A
′eˆS vˆ
′
mod N
∀i ∈ V : Cˆi ← C−ci RmˆiS rˆi mod N
∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ : Rˆi¯,j¯ ← R−cC aˆi¯,j¯i¯ C
bˆi¯,j¯
j¯
S rˆi¯,j¯ mod N
4. Compute the verification challenge:
cˆ← H(context, A′, Z, Ci, Zˆ, Cˆi, Rˆi¯,j¯, n3)
5. Verify equality of challenge
if c = cˆ then
accept
else
reject, outputting ⊥.
We include the correctness proof for the proof of possession of P3 in Figure 3. While the
proof is straight-forward, we pay attention to the transformation between the blinded
graph signature (A′, e′, v′) used in the proof and the originally signed graph signature
(A, e, v).
Figure 4 contains the correctness proof for the coprimality statement. We draw at-
tention to the use of Be´zout’s Identity to prove that vertex representations mi¯ and mj¯
must be coprime:
1 = ai¯,j¯ ·mi¯ + bi¯,j¯ ·mj¯
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holds if and only if mi¯ and mj¯ are coprime. In a setting with unknown group order
# QRN , this yields an equation over integer exponents:
R ≡ R(ai¯,j¯ ·mi¯)Rb(¯i,j¯ ·mj¯) (mod N),
which is used in Figure 3, Equation †.
7 Component Provers
Provers are organized to have a Pre-Challenge Phase and a Post-Challenge Phase. In
the Pre-Challenge Phase, the Prover receives as input the reference of the values being
proven (a graph signature, a commitment, etc.) and outputs the witnesses (t-values). In
this phase, the prover computes and stores the witness randomness.
In the Post-Challenge Phase, the Prover takes as input the common challenge c and
outputs the responses (hat-values) matching its secrets and witness randomness.
The sub-ordinate prover objects stay alive between Pre-Challenge and Post-Challenge
Phase and keep their internal state.
Algorithm 21: blindGS(): Blinding of a given graph signature (A, e, v).
Input: Graph signature (A, e, v), Signer public key pk, gs params
Pre-conditions: (A, e, v) is a valid graph signature under Signer public key pk.
Output: Blinded graph signature (A′, e′, v′).
Post-conditions: A′, e′, v′) is a valid graph signature on the same graph G.
1 Choose blinding randomness uniformly at random rA ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø
2 Get base S and N from pk
3 A′ ← ASrA (mod N)
4 v′ ← v − e · rA
5 e′ ← e− 2`e−1
6 return (A’, e’, v’)
7.1 Protocol: ProverOrchestrator()
7.1.1 Pre-Challenge Phase
Inputs
Verifier nonce n3 ∈ {0, 1}`H
1. Computation of commitments (delegated to Commitment() factory:
1.1 The Prover computes commitments on all vertex representations:
Ci ← ReiΠk∈fV (i)ekSri mod N
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Given:
P3 = (c, A
′, eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0, mˆi, mˆ(i,j), rˆi, . . .)
A′ ≡ ASrA (mod N); v′ = v − e · rA
e′ = e− 2`e−1
Zˆ ≡
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c
Rmˆ00
(
Rmˆipi(i) · · ·R
mˆ(i,j)
pi(i,j)
)
A′eˆS vˆ
′
(mod N)
≡
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c
R
(m˜0+c·m0)
0
(
R
(m˜i+c·mi)
pi(i) · · ·R
(m˜(i,j)+c·m(i,j))
pi(i,j)
)
A′(e˜+c·e
′)S(v˜
′+c·v′) (mod N)
≡
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c
Rm˜00 R
c·m0
0 R
m˜i
pi(i)R
c·mi
pi(i) · · ·R
m˜(i,j)
pi(i,j)R
c·m(i,j)
pi(i,j) A
′e˜A′c·e
′
S v˜
′
Sc·v
′
(mod N)
≡
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c (
Rm˜00 R
m˜i
pi(i) · · ·R
m˜(i,j)
pi(i,j)A
′e˜S v˜
′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z˜ (mod N)
(
Rc·m00 R
c·mi
pi(i) · · ·R
c·m(i,j)
pi(i,j) A
′c·e′Sc·v
′
)
(mod N)
≡
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c
Z˜
(
Rc·m00 R
c·mi
pi(i) · · ·R
c·m(i,j)
pi(i,j) A
′c·e′Sc·v
′
)
(mod N)
≡
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c
Z˜
(
Rm00 R
mi
pi(i) · · ·R
m(i,j)
pi(i,j)A
′e′Sv
′
)c
(mod N)
≡
(
Z
(ASrA)2
`e−1
)−c
Z˜
(
Rm00 R
mi
pi(i) · · ·R
m(i,j)
pi(i,j) (AS
rA)(e−2
`e−1) S(v−e·rA)
)c
(mod N)
≡ Z−c Z˜
(
Rm00 R
mi
pi(i) · · ·R
m(i,j)
pi(i,j) (AS
rA)(e−2
`e−1) S−e·rASv
)c (
(ASrA)(2
`e−1)
)c
(mod N)
≡ Z−c Z˜
(
Rm00 R
mi
pi(i) · · ·R
m(i,j)
pi(i,j) (AS
rA)(e−2
`e−1) S−e·rASv (ASrA)(2
`e−1)
)c
(mod N)
≡ Z−c Z˜
(
Rm00 R
mi
pi(i) · · ·R
m(i,j)
pi(i,j) (AS
rA)e S−e·rASv
)c
(mod N)
≡ Z−c Z˜
(
Rm00 R
mi
pi(i) · · ·R
m(i,j)
pi(i,j)A
eSe·rAS−e·rASv
)c
(mod N)
≡ Z−c Z˜
Rm00 Rmipi(i) · · ·Rm(i,j)pi(i,j)AeSv︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z (mod N)

c
(mod N)
≡ Z−c Z˜ (Z)c !≡ Z˜ (mod N)
Figure 3: Correctness proof for the verification of the proof of possession of P3. The
second part of the proof transforms the blinded graph signature (A′, e′, v′) to the original
graph signature (A, e, v).
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Given:
P3 = (c, . . . , mˆi, . . . , aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)
ri¯,j¯ = −ri · ai¯,j¯ − rj · bi¯,j¯
1 = ai¯,j¯ ·mi¯ + bi¯,j¯ ·mj¯
Rˆi¯,j¯ ≡ R−cC aˆi¯,j¯i¯ C
bˆi¯,j¯
j¯
S rˆi¯,j¯ (mod N)
≡ R−c C(a˜i¯,j¯+c·ai¯,j¯)
i¯
C
(b˜i¯,j¯+c·bi¯,j¯)
j¯
S(r˜i¯,j¯+c·ri¯,j¯) (mod N)
≡ R−c
(
C
a˜i¯,j¯
i¯
C
b˜i¯,j¯
j¯
S r˜i¯,j¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡R˜i¯,j¯ (mod N)
(
C
(c·ai¯,j¯)
i¯
C
(c·bi¯,j¯)
j¯
S(c·ri¯,j¯)
)
(mod N)
≡ R−c R˜i¯,j¯
(
C
(c·ai¯,j¯)
i¯
C
(c·bi¯,j¯)
j¯
S(c·ri¯,j¯)
)
(mod N)
≡ R−c R˜i¯,j¯
(
C
ai¯,j¯
i¯
C
bi¯,j¯
j¯
Sri¯,j¯
)c
(mod N)
≡ R−c R˜i¯,j¯
(
(Rmi¯Sri¯)ai¯,j¯ (Rmj¯Srj¯)bi¯,j¯ Sri¯,j¯
)c
(mod N)
≡ R−c R˜i¯,j¯
(
R(ai¯,j¯ ·mi¯)R(bi¯,j¯ ·mj¯) S(ai¯,j¯ ·ri¯)S(bi¯,j¯ ·rj¯)Sri¯,j¯
)c
(mod N)
≡ R−c R˜i¯,j¯
R(ai¯,j¯ ·mi¯)R(bi¯,j¯ ·mj¯) S(ai¯,j¯ ·ri¯)S(bi¯,j¯ ·rj¯)S(−ri·ai¯,j¯−rj ·bi¯,j¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡1 (mod N)
c (mod N)
≡ R−c R˜i¯,j¯
R(ai¯,j¯ ·mi¯)R(bi¯,j¯ ·mj¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡R (mod N)
c (mod N) (†)
≡ R−c R˜i¯,j¯ Rc !≡ R˜i¯,j¯
Figure 4: Correctness proof for the verification of the coprimality proof of P3. Its final
equation † uses Be´zout’s Identity and the proven coprimality of mi¯ and mj¯.
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1.2 The Prover stores the public values and commitment randomness in the com-
mon values store:
• ∀i ∈ V :
store(Ci, ri)
2. The Prover obtains blinded graph signature (A′, e′, v′), running Algorithm 21.
3. The Prover stores the blinded graph signature
store(A′, e′, v′)
4. The Prover calls upon the component provers to execute their pre-computations.
• The PairWiseDifferenceProver() will compute the coprimality evidence for its
proofs based on the commitments Ci stored.
5. The Prover calls the Pre-Challenge Phase of component provers in turn, with refer-
ences to messages addressed, each returning a t˜-value as output of their first phase.
5.1 (Z˜)← GSPossessionProver()
5.2 ∀i ∈ V :
(C˜i)← CommitmentProver(i)
5.3 ∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ :
(R˜i¯,j¯)← PairWiseDifferenceProver(¯i, j¯)
The component prover instances are kept alive for the Post-Challenge Phase.
6. if any prover returns ⊥ then abort the proof, outputting ⊥.
7. Compute the common challenge:
7.1 The Prover gathers the ordered list of all public values and all t˜-values provided
by component provers.
7.2 The Prover canonicalizes and serializes the concatenation of proof values
according to a pre-defined order: context first, then general public values
(A′, Z), then commitments and other public values, then witnesses, nonce n3
finally.
7.3 The Prover computes the hash of this string to produce the Fiat-Shamir chal-
lenge:
c← H(context, A′, Z, Ci, Z˜, C˜i, R˜i¯,j¯, n3)
8. The Prover calls the Post-Challenge Phase of component provers in turn, each
prover returning its responses, the hat-values.
8.1 (eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0,∀i ∈ V : mˆi,∀(i, j) ∈ E : mˆ(i,j))← GSPossessionProver()
8.2 ∀i ∈ V :
(rˆi)← CommitmentProver(i)
8.3 ∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ :
(aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)← PairWiseDifferenceProver(¯i, j¯)
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9. if any component prover response is ⊥ then abort the proof, outputting ⊥.
10. The Prover assembles the final proof.
10.1 The Prover creates an ordered list prefixed by (c, A′) followed by the ordered
lists of responses of the component provers.
10.2 The Prover canonicalizes and serializes the proof:
P3 ← (c, A′, eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0, mˆi, mˆ(i,j), rˆi, aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)
11. The Prover sends P3 to the Verifier.
Outputs
Proof:
Challenge c
Blinded graph signature A′
Responses/hat-values sˆ
7.2 Protocol: GSPossessionProver()
Governed State
Witness randomness:
• e˜, v˜, m˜0
• ∀i ∈ V :
m˜i ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
• ∀(i, j) ∈ E :
m˜(i,j) ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
7.2.1 Pre-Challenge Phase
Inputs
Blinded graph signature (A′, e′, v′)
1. Choose witness randomness uniformly at random:
• e˜ ∈R ±{0, 1}`′e+`ø+`H+1
• v˜ ∈R ±{0, 1}`v+`ø+`H+1
• m˜0 ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
• ∀i ∈ V :
m˜i ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
• ∀(i, j) ∈ E :
m˜(i,j) ∈R ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+1
2. Store the witnesses as common values:
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• store(e˜, v˜, m˜0)
• ∀i ∈ V : store(m˜i)
• ∀(i, j) ∈ E : store(m˜(i,j))
3. Compute GSPossessionProver() witness:
Z˜ ← (A′)e˜Rm˜00 Rm˜ipi(i) · · ·R
m˜(i,j)
pi(i,j)S
v˜′ mod N
4. Output (Z˜).
Outputs
Witness Z˜
7.2.2 Post-Challenge Phase
Inputs
Challenge c
1. Retrieve witnesses from the common values store:
• retrieve(e˜, v˜, m˜0)
• ∀i ∈ V : retrieve(m˜i)
• ∀(i, j) ∈ E : retrieve(m˜(i,j))
2. Retrieve the secrets of the blinded graph signature from the common values store:
• retrieve(e′, v′,m0)
• ∀i ∈ V : retrieve(mi)
• ∀(i, j) ∈ E : retrieve(m(i,j))
3. Compute the GSPossessionProver() responses:
• eˆ← e˜+ c · e′
• vˆ′ ← v˜′ + c · v′
• mˆ0 ← m˜0 + c ·m0
• ∀i ∈ V :
mˆi ← m˜i + c ·mi
• ∀(i, j) ∈ E :
mˆ(i,j) ← m˜(i,j) + c ·m(i,j)
4. Output list of responses:
(eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0,∀i ∈ V : mˆi, ∀(i, j) ∈ E : mˆ(i,j))
Outputs
Responses (eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0, mˆi, mˆ(i,j))
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7.3 Protocol: CommitmentProver()
Governed State
Witness randomness:
• r˜i
7.3.1 Pre-Challenge Phase
Inputs
Message reference mi
1. Choose witness randomness uniformly at random:
• r˜i ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
2. Store the witness:
• store(r˜i)
3. Retrieve the witness randomness of committed messages from the common values
store:
retrieve(m˜i)
4. Compute CommitmentProver() witness C˜i:
C˜i ← Rm˜iS r˜i mod N
5. Output C˜i.
Outputs
Witness C˜i
7.3.2 Post-Challenge Phase
Inputs
Challenge c
1. Retrieve witnesses from the common values store:
• retrieve(r˜i)
2. Retrieve the commitment randomness from the common values store:
• retrieve(ri)
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3. Compute the CommitmentProver() response:
rˆi ← r˜i + c · ri
4. Output rˆi
Outputs
Responses (rˆi)
7.4 Protocol: PairWiseDifferenceProver()
Governed State
Coprimality Secrets:
• ai¯,j¯, bi¯,j¯
• ri¯,j¯
Witness randomness:
• a˜i¯,j¯, b˜i¯,j¯
• r˜i¯,j¯
7.4.1 Pre-Challenge Phase
Inputs
Pair-wise different commitment references i¯ and j¯
1. Precomputation:
1.1 Retrieve the commitment messages and randomness from the common values
store:
• retrieve(mi, ri)
• retrieve(mj, rj)
1.2 Solve the Extended Euclidian Algorithm for mi and mj:
(di¯,j¯, ai¯,j¯, bi¯,j¯)← EEA(mi,mj)
1.3 if di¯,j¯ 6= 1 then abort the proof, because mi and mj are not coprime.
1.4 Compute the differential commitment randomnesss:
ri¯,j¯ ← −ri¯ · ai¯,j¯ − rj¯ · bi¯,j¯
1.5 Store the coprimality secrets and differential randomness:
• store(ai¯,j¯, bi¯,j¯)
• store(ri¯,j¯)
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2. Choose witness randomness uniformly at random:
• a˜i¯,j¯ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
• b˜i¯,j¯ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
• r˜i¯,j¯ ∈R ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
3. Store witness randomness:
• store(a˜i¯,j¯, b˜i¯,j¯)
• store(r˜i¯,j¯)
4. Compute PairWiseDifferenceProver() Witness:
R˜i¯,j¯ ← C a˜i¯,j¯i¯ C
b˜i¯,j¯
j¯
S r˜i¯,j¯ mod N
5. Output R˜i¯,j¯
Outputs
Witness: R˜i¯,j¯
7.4.2 Post-Challenge Phase
Inputs
Challenge c
1. Retrieve coprimality secrets:
• retrieve(ai¯,j¯, bi¯,j¯)
• retrieve(ri¯,j¯)
2. Retrieve witness randomness:
• retrieve(a˜i¯,j¯, b˜i¯,j¯)
• retrieve(r˜i¯,j¯)
3. Compute the PairWiseDifferenceProver() responses:
• aˆi¯,j¯ ← a˜i¯,j¯ + c · ai¯,j¯
• bˆi¯,j¯ ← b˜i¯,j¯ + c · bi¯,j¯
• rˆi¯,j¯ ← r˜i¯,j¯ + c · ri¯,j¯
4. Output (aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)
Outputs
Responses: (aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)
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8 Component Verifiers
Each Verifier is responsible for taking the common values, the public values and the
responses (hat-values) of its protocol as input and to output the candidate verification
witness (hat-value) as output.
8.1 VerifierOrchestrator()
Inputs
Proof P3, incl.
Challenge c
Public values Z,A′, Ci
1. The Verifier populates its common values store with the public values of the proof.
• store(Z,A′)
• store(Ci)
2. The Verifier calls the component verifiers in turn, offering as input the challenge c
along with the corresponding component prover responses. Each component verifier
will return a single tˆ value, a verifier witness.
2.1 Zˆ ← GSPossessionVerifier(c, A′, (eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0,∀i ∈ V : mˆi,∀(i, j) ∈ E : mˆ(i,j)))
2.2 ∀i ∈ V :
Cˆi ← CommitmentVerifier(c, (rˆi))
2.3 ∀i¯, j¯ ∈ V¯ :
Rˆi¯,j¯ ← PairwiseDifferenceVerifier(c, (aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯))
2.1 The Verifier gathers the ordered list of all public values and all tˆ-values pro-
vided by component verifiers.
2.2 The Verifier canonicalizes and serializes the concatenation of the tˆ-values
according to a pre-defined order: context first, then general public values
(A′, Z), then commitments and other public values, then tˆ-values, nonce n3
finally.
2.3 The Verifier computes the hash of this string to produce the Verifier ’s version
of the Fiat-Shamir challenge cˆ:
cˆ← H(context, A′, Z, Ci, Zˆ, Cˆi, Rˆi¯,j¯, n3)
3. Verify equality of challenge
if c = cˆ then
accept
else
reject, outputting ⊥.
Outputs
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8.2 Protocol: GSPossessionVerifier()
Inputs
Challenge c
Blinded graph signature A′
GSPossessionProver() responses: (eˆ, vˆ′, mˆ0,∀i ∈ V : mˆi, ∀(i, j) ∈ E : mˆ(i,j))
1. Check lengths:
• eˆ ∈ ±{0, 1}l′e+`ø+`H+1
• vˆ ∈ ±{0, 1}`v+`ø+`H+1
• mˆ0 ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2
• ∀i ∈ V :
mˆi ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2
• ∀(i, j) ∈ E :
mˆ(i,j) ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2
2. if any length check fails then reject the proof and abort verification, outputting⊥.
3. Compute GSPossessionVerifier() tˆ-value:
Zˆ ←
(
Z
A′2`e−1
)−c
Rmˆ00 (R
mˆi
pi(i) · · ·R
mˆ(i,j)
pi(i,j) )A
′eˆS vˆ
′
mod N
4. Output Zˆ.
Outputs
Verification witness: Zˆ
8.3 Protocol: CommitmentVerifier()
Inputs
Challenge c
CommitmentProver() response: rˆi
1. Retrieve corresponding message secrets.
retrieve(mˆi)
2. Check lengths:
• rˆi ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
• mˆi ∈ ±{0, 1}`m+`ø+`H+2
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3. if any length check fails then reject the proof and abort verification, outputting
⊥.
4. Compute the CommitmentVerifier() tˆ-value:
Cˆi ← C−ci RmˆiS rˆi mod N
5. Output Cˆi.
Outputs
Verifier witness: Cˆi
8.4 Protocol: PairWiseDifferenceVerifier()
Inputs
Challenge c
PairWiseDifferenceProver() responses: (aˆi¯,j¯, bˆi¯,j¯, rˆi¯,j¯)
1. Check lengths:
• aˆi¯,j¯ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
• bˆi¯,j¯ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
• rˆi¯,j¯ ∈ ±{0, 1}`n+`ø+`H+1
if any length check fails then reject the proof and abort verification, outputting⊥.
2. Compute the PairWiseDifferenceVerifier() tˆ value:
Rˆi¯,j¯ ← R−cC aˆi¯,j¯i¯ C
bˆi¯,j¯
j¯
S rˆi¯,j¯ mod N
3. Output Rˆi¯,j¯
Outputs
Verifier witness: Rˆi¯,j¯
9 Recommendations
To securely use the graph signature scheme and the TOPOCERT tool, it is neces-
sary to follow key size requirements specified for SRSA Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signa-
tures [CL02, IBM13]. In general, the TOPOCERT tool is meant to operate in an imple-
mentation with a 2048-bits key strength and appropriately selected parameters, which
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Table 1: Parameters of the graph signature scheme gs params and encoding setup
enc params . Parameters for the underlying Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme
are largely adapted from the Identity Mixer Specification [IBM13]. In the implementa-
tion, this table is referred to as table:params.
(a) Parameters of Keygen()
Parameter Description Bit-length
`n Bit length of the special RSA modulus 2048
`Γ Bit length of the commitment group 1632
`ρ Bit length of the prime order of the subgroup of Γ 256
`m Maximal bit length of messages encoding vertices and
edges
256
`res Number of reserved messages 1†
`e Bit length of the certificate component e 597
`′e Bit length of the interval the e values are taken from 120
`v Bit length of the certificate component v 2724
`ø Security parameter for statistical zero-knowledge 80
`H Bit length of the cryptographic hash function used for
the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic
256
`r Security parameter for the security proof of the CL-
scheme
80
`pt The prime number generation to have an error proba-
bility to return a composite of 1− 1/2`pt
80†
Note: † refers to numbers that are integers, not bit lengths.
(b) Parameters of GraphEncodingSetup()
`V Maximal number of vertices to be encoded 1000†‡
`′V Reserved bit length for vertex encoding (bit length of
the largest encodable prime representative)
120
`E Maximal number of edges to be encoded 50.000†‡
`L Maximal number of labels to be encoded 256†‡
`′L Reserved bit length for label encoding 16
Note: † refers to numbers that are integers, not bit lengths; ‡ refers to the default
parameter, not the theoretical maximum.
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implies parameters as defined in Table 1. For a detailed specification of the parameter se-
lection for the underlying Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme, we refer to Tables 2
and 3 of the Specification of the Identity Mixer Cryptographic Library, Version 2.3.40,
on p. 43 [IBM13].
Remark 1 (Security Parameter). The security parameters, especially bit length for the
group setups, flow from the specification of the bit length of the special RSA modulus `n
and the message space `m. The constraints placed on the respective bit lengths are crucial
to maintain the soundness of the security proof of the underlying Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
signature scheme (cf. Table 3 of the Specification of the Identity Mixer Cryptographic
Library, Version 2.3.40, on p. 43 [IBM13]).
Remark 2 (Encoding Parameters). We consider the choices made for the graph encoding
scheme.
Encoding Defaults The bit length parameters for the prime encoding `′V and `
′
L follow
from the available message bit length, assuming that the labels are encoded as the
lowest prime representatives. However, the given defaults for number of vertices,
edges, labels to be encoded `V , `E , and `L are not the theoretical maxima.
Maximal Number of Labels For a single-labeled graph with `′L = 16, the maximal
encodable number of labels is 6542. The restrictions of the number of labels is
in place to allow for multi-labeled graphs, in which case the product of the label
identifiers occupies the reserved space.
Maximal Number of Vertices The maximal number of vertices for the reserved bit
length `′V = 120 is 1.59810
34. The limiting factor for the number of encoded vertices,
however, is not the reserved bit length of the message space, but the space required
to store the corresponding based dedicated vertex and edge encoding. For each
possibly encodable vertex and edge the graph signature scheme needs to reserve
a group element with an bit length of `n = 2048. A encoding for fully connected
graphs with `V = 1000 and `E = `V(`V −1) = 999000 would consume 244.28 kBytes
for vertices and 243.89 MBytes for the edges.
Remark 3 (Signature Size). A signature of the graph signature scheme consists of one
group element and two exponents A, e, v). A single signature has the following bit length
for the default parameters in Table 1:
|(A, e, v)|2 = `n + `v + `e = 5369 bits.
Remark 4 (Base Randomization). We note here that the graph signature scheme proposed
by Groß [Gro15] requires a base randomization for multi-use confidentiality of graph
elements. This is because the bases referenced in the ZKPoK are public knowledge and
each proof reveals which exponents are harbored by which base.
The base randomization asks that random permutations piV and piE be applied to the
vertex and edge bases respectively. A space-efficient solution for that requirement could
use keyed pseudorandom permutations.
Let an appropriate family of pseudorandom permutations F on group elements in
QRN be given, where pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) are defined as by Katz and
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Lindell [KL14]. Theoretical work on constructions of pseudorandom permutations from
pseudorandom functions was spawned by the seminal work of Luby and Rackoff [LR88].
As an alternative approach, we also refer to constructions of Verifiable Secret Shuffles,
such as Neff [Nef01], which allow a Prover in a honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof sce-
nario to convince a Verifier that a secret shuffled was computed correctly.
1. During the Signer’s round of HiddenSign(), S chooses a uniformly random permu-
tation key k with appropriate bit length.
2. S applies the pseudorandom permutations (piV , piE) with common key k to the cer-
tified base sets, obtaining permuted base sets.
3. Signer S then encodes graph G on the derived base sets.
4. Signer S shares permutation key k with the Recipient together with the correspond-
ing signature σk = (A, e, v)k along with a proof of representation that σk indeed
fulfills the CL-equation on the derived bases.
Hence, the Signer will issue multiple signatures, one for each permutation. Each signature
has a size of one group element, two exponents, and one permutation key.
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